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This paper examines the effects of demographic change on public finances in a federal 
system. We develop a simple methodical procedure to measure the effect of demographic 
changes on public revenues and expenditures. We apply our method to the local, state and 
federal government sector as well as on the social security system in Germany. Our results 
suggest that demographic change will lead to significant vertical fiscal imbalances between 
the different layers of government. In addition we show, that subnational governments can 
generate a demographic dividend whereas the social security system and the federal 
government have to carry an additional burden due to ageing.  
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Societies in industrialized countries are graying around the globe and Germany is one of the most 
severely affected countries. These demographic changes will have a significant impact on economic 
developments
1 and on government budgets and the social security system. The latter is of special 
importance for countries that suffer from problems of fiscal sustainability because of high public debt 
and deficits in the design of social security systems. With respect to the sustainability of public 
finances and the social security system Germany is in some trouble because of the high costs of 
German reunification and the dramatic increase in public debt since 1990, see OECD (2006). In recent 
years some reforms have been introduced and the current economic recovery has contributed to an 
improvement of the fiscal stance at all levels of government but the critical issue is the question 
whether these reforms have been sufficient to meet the challenges imposed by the significant 
demographic change in the decades ahead. 
 
There is a considerable literature on the interrelations between demographics and public finances (e.g. 
Cutler, Elmendorf and Zeckhauser 1993, Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou 2000 or Sanz and Velázquez 
2007). The bulk of this literature addresses the social security system (see e.g. Börsch-Supan 2000, 
Gruber and Wise 2001, Roig 2006, Disney 2007, Werding 2007) or central government budgets (see 
Franco and Munzi 1997 for EU countries, van Ewijk et al. 2006 for the Netherlands or Bach et al. 
2002 for Germany). In addition, some researchers have focused their attention on specific spending 
components, with education being the most prominent subject (see e.g. Poterba 1997 or Harris, Evans 
and Schwab 2001). However, an issue that is looked upon only rarely are the repercussions of 
demographic change on the budgets of the different layers of government in federal systems. Lee and 
Edwards (2001) for the U.S., the Conference Board of Canada (2002) for Canada, and Seitz and 
Kempkes (2007) as well as Seitz (2007) for Germany examined this issue and show that the different 
layers of government are affected quite differently by changes in the number and age composition of 
                                                 
1 See for example Lindh and Malmberg (1999), Zhang and Zhang (2005), Batini, Callen and McKibbin (2006) or 
Echevarría and Iza (2006). 
  2the population.
2 These might result in vertical fiscal imbalances
3 across the various levels of 
governments, see for example Lazar, St-Hilaire and Tremblay (2003) and Ruggeri (2001), which 
raises the question whether the distribution of revenues across the different layers of government has 
to be adjusted to cope with demographic changes.  
 
In this paper we examine the effects of demographic change on the fiscal position of the federal, state 
and local government sector as well as the social security system in Germany extending our previous 
work on this subject, see Seitz and Kempkes (2007) and Seitz (2007). As compared to centrally 
managed states, federal countries have some peculiarities that make the management of adjustment to 
demographic change more difficult because more policy makers with conflicting attitudes are involved 
and issues of the distribution of expenditures and revenues across the layers of government are of 
considerable importance in politics. Thus, in many federal states, such as in Germany, 
interjurisdictional fiscal transfers are quite significant and create vertical fiscal spillover effects. In 
addition, the distribution of tasks across the different levels of government is quite heterogeneous and 
thus the effects of demographic change on fiscal budgets vary across the layers of government. In 
Germany, as in many other countries too, another problem arises because the social security system is 
financed both out of social security contributions of employees and employers as well as tax-financed 
transfers. Because in general the social security system is rather sensitive with respect to demographic 
change, such as the pension system, government levels responsible for financing these tax transfers are 
more severely affected than other levels of government. Thus for example, the Conference Board of 
Canada (2002) has calculated that in Canada the provinces, which are responsible for financing health 
services, will have to carry a significant burden of demographic changes whereas the central 
government is not that much affected. In Germany, see Seitz (2007), it is the central government 
which has to provide transfers to the social security system. Consequently, in federal systems the 
effects of demographic changes across the levels of governments crucial depends upon the design of 
the federal system and the interrelations between the public sector and the social security system.  
 
                                                 
2 Echevarria (1995) has studied this issue theoretically. 
3 For the concept of vertical fiscal imbalances see Boadway and Tremblay (2006). 
  3The paper is organized as follows. Section II develops a method to inspect the impact of demographic 
change on government budgets, taking restrictions on fiscal sustainability into account. The empirical 
part of the paper applies our method in several steps. In a first step, section III presents estimates of 
age cost and age revenue profiles by level of government in Germany. Using these estimates, section 
IV develops simulations to study the impact of demographic change on government budgets taking 
fiscal transfers between the various levels of government into account. Finally, section V summarizes 
our findings and presents conclusions for fiscal policy in Germany as well as future research. 
 
II. The age profile approach 
 
The basic idea of the concept of age cost and revenue profiles consists of estimating the distribution of 
public expenditures and revenues across age groups. The age profile concept is quite distinct from the 
generational accounting approach (GA) as pioneered by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
4 Whereas GA 
examines the benefit and tax burden profile of each generation, the age profile approach takes a cross-
section view of the public budget and thus fits well into the sustainability approach as developed by 
Blanchard et al. (1990) which is used for policy analysis by the OECD. One advantage of the age 
profile approach is that the informational requirements are far more modest as compared to the 
information necessary to run a GA analysis. However, this goes at the expense that no estimates of the 
distribution of benefits and burdens across generations can be derived. Nevertheless, both approaches 
share the same purpose namely linking public budgets to demographics and examining the question 
whether demographic change will worsen or improve the sustainability of public finances.  
 
The starting point of the analysis is the dynamic government budget constraint: 
(1)  t t t t R E i B B − + + = − ) 1 ( 1  
where B denotes the level of public debt and E and R identify primary expenditures and public revenue 
in period t.  i  is the nominal interest rate, which is assumed to be time invariant throughout our 
theoretical exposition.  
                                                 
4 The generational accounting approach is discussed extensively in Auerbach et al. (1991) and Auerbach et al. 
(1994). 
  4 
Expenditures are assigned to different age cohorts by using age cost profiles at each level of 
government and in each function, such as education, administration etc, see Seitz and Kempkes (2007) 
or Seitz (2007). Thus expenditures in year t at government level f are given by: 
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,t denotes total expenditures at government level f (federal, state and local government sector and the 
social security system), N(x,t) denotes the population of age x in period t, with  x the maximum age, 
and  ΣxN(x,t) = Nt  is total population. The term e(x,j,f,t)  is the age cost profile which captures 
information on per capita spending on citizens aged x for the public good j (such as education, health, 
etc.) at government level f in period t: 
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If the public good j is not age-specific (such as defense) the entries in e(x,j,t,f) are identical across all 
age groups.  
 
If information about age specific spending is available one can derive a naïve forecast of the future 
development of total public spending if age cost profiles are assumed to be time-invariant in which 
case future expenditures up to period t+τ evolve according to: 








t f j x e t x N E
11
) , , ( ) , ( τ τ . 
In such a setting public expenditures are exclusively driven by changes both in the number as well as 
the age composition of the population. 
 
However, there are numerous factors that can bring about changes in age cost profiles: Inflation and 
real productivity growth that affect virtually all expenditures alike, see for example Franco and Munzi 
(1997), cohort size effects (Poterba 1997, Baum and Seitz 2003), effects induced by changes in 
political preferences which can be depicted by the age composition of the electorate (Poterba 1997 or 
  5Brunner and Balsdon 2004) and participation effects or cohort effects (Pearson, Smith and White 
1989) are the most important reasons for age cost profiles to change over time, see Lee and Edwards 
(2001) for a more detailed discussion. In addition, changing demographics bring about adjustments in 
the economy, such as real productivity growth, factor prices, the taxation capacity etc. which will have 
repercussions on both the expenditure and revenue side of public budgets (see for example Galor 
2005). As a matter of course, incorporating all of these effects is hardly possible in an empirical 
investigation and in our subsequent empirical work we take into account only the most important 
factors.  
 
Adjustments in age cost profiles due to the above mentioned effects can be incorporated in the 
forecasting mechanism by adding an adjustment parameter,  ) , , , , ( f S t j x e τ λ + , to equation (4) that 
captures all changes in age cost profiles in the period t through t+τ. The vector S (S1,…,SZ) denotes a 
set of variables that drive the adjustment parameter, such as productivity growth, price adjustments, 
changes in political preferences, the behavior of firms and individuals, etc. S also captures changes in 
policy which have already been implemented but do not yet have visible effects on revenues and 
expenditures.
5 Moreover, S can include policy measures that are on the top of the political agenda
6 
and have a high probability to be put into effect in the years ahead. Thus in a more general setting, 
spending at government level f evolves according to: 
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In this more general setting the age cost profile in period t+τ is given by  
  e(x,  j,  t+τ, f) = e(x, j, t, f)  ) , , , , ( f S t j x e τ λ + . 
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5 Thus for example, in Germany changes in pension laws have already been introduced but fiscal effects will not 
arise before the next decade. 
6 An example is the current debate on the increase in kindergarten services in Germany, which has already 
resulted in proposals in the legislation process but the legislation process is not yet finished. 
  6Public revenues  in year t for government level f result out of k different sources. The age revenue 
profile r(x,k,t,f) denotes the average per capita revenue at government level f collected from age group 




) , , , , ( f S t j x r τ λ + , in order to incorporate changes in the revenue profile to derive 
more realistic estimates of future revenue growth.  
 
Next we examine the impact of demographics on the fiscal stance. Suppressing the index f we can 
write the budget restriction in the following form: 
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In order to examine the question whether demographic change will lead to sustainability problems we 
have to set appropriate sustainability targets, such as a balanced-budget rule or a fixed debt-GDP ratio, 
which makes it possible to derive tax and/or expenditure adjustments necessary to ensure 
sustainability. In addition, we have to fix the set of policy instruments that are used to achieve 
sustainability which is in our case primary expenditure growth. In federal systems with a high degree 
of tax sharing among the different tiers of government, such as in Germany, manipulating primary 
expenditures is much easier than changing tax laws, because the different tiers of government can 
independently adjust expenditures whereas changing tax laws usually requests a complicated and time 
consuming coordination process which involves all 16 state governments
7 and the federal government. 
As sustainability target we impose a balanced budget rule which yields a simple equation for total 
primary expenditures,  t E
~
, which can be financed under the balanced budget rule: 
(7)  1
~
− − = t t t iB R E  
To examine the impact of demographic change as well as the impact of changes in the other variables 
taken into account in our modeling framework we differentiate primary expenditures in equation (4´) 
with respect to time: 
                                                 
7 In Germany, for example, the state governments have virtually no power to tax. The bulk of state tax revenues 
comes from shared tax resources and even most of taxes that accrue to the state level are fixed by federal law. 
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The first term on the right hand side is the change in primary expenditures induced by demographic 
change, taking public service levels as given. The second component denotes the impact of the set of 
the S-variables taken into account in our policy simulation. However, the time path of Et as calculated 
in equation (8) need not be identical to the time path of sustainable primary expenditures  t E
~
 as 
calculated in equation (7). To close this gap we define another component of sustainable expenditure 
growth which we call residual expenditure,  :  R
t E
(9)  τ τ τ + + + − = t t
R
t E E E
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Residual expenditure growth can be both positive as well as negative. In the former case, expenditure 
changes induced by demographics as well as the variables captured by the S-vector do not exhaust 
sustainable expenditure growth and thus there is scope for additional expenditure growth. In the latter 
case, demographics and the S-variables demand a spending volume that cannot be financed under 
conditions of sustainability and thus future generations have to cut expenditures. The variable E
R 
closes the gap between the components on the right hand side of equation (8) and sustainable primary 
expenditure, t E
~
. To ensure identification, we assume that residual primary expenditure growth affects 
all age groups and spending functions identically and consequently residual primary expenditure 
growth is used as a scaling factor to ensure sustainability. In addition, we note that residual 
expenditure growth can be used as an indicator of the freedom to act of future generations. The larger 
(smaller) residual expenditure growth is the less (more) current politics as well as demographic 
developments restrict future generations. Therefore, the method outlined makes it possible to evaluate 




                                                 
8 It should also be stressed that our procedure brings about an endogenization of the age-cost profile that ensures 
a balanced budget. 
  8III. Empirical Application I: Estimating age cost and revenue profiles 
 
Official statistics rarely provide direct information on the distribution of public expenditures and 
revenues across age groups, and therefore we have to develop estimates of both age cost and age 
revenue profiles. To derive such estimates we use the indicator matrix method as suggested by Seitz 
and Kempkes (2007) and Seitz (2007) which yields the following estimate of the age-cost profiles for 
government level f and function j: 
(10)   ) , (
) ( ) , (
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f denotes net expenditures, defined as total expenditures minus transfers received from upper level of 
government in function j at government level f. The indicator matrix Ie(x,j), which is the key element 
of the estimation procedure, contains all information and assumptions about the demand of a 
representative citizen in age group x in function j.
9 In the empirical investigation we subdivide the 
population in 7 age groups. The entries in the indicator matrix can be looked upon as estimates of the 
(normalized) degree of utilization of the public good in question by the various age groups. We 
normalize the entries such that the age group that demands the specific public service most intensively 
is assigned the value “1”. A “0” entry in the Ie matrix means that the specific age group does not 
consume the public good provided within the specific government function. If all entries in a row are 
“1”, this public service is consumed by all age groups with the same intensity. To derive an estimate of 
the age revenue profile we proceed similarly by constructing an indicator matrix for tax revenues, 
Ir(x,k), which can be used to estimate an age revenue profile 
 
The entries in the expenditure indicator matrix Ie are derived by using data on the age structure of 
clients/users in the various fields of activities as well as a-priori reasoning.
10 The elements of the 
revenue indicator matrix Ir are constructed by examining micro-data on tax payments and evidence 
                                                 
9 Note that the indicator matrix is assumed to be identical across all levels of government because more detailed 
information is not available. 
10 In the case of general public administration, defense, etc. there is no reason to assume that different age groups 
are served differently, and consequently each age cohort is assigned the value “1” in the age-cost indicator 
matrix. For more details on how to derive the entries in Table 4, see Seitz and Kempkes (2007). 
  9presented by Bach et al. (2002). It should be noted that revenues and expenditures are measured in 
terms of net values, which means, that transfers from other (usually upper) levels of government are 
subtracted from both revenues as well as expenditures. The reason for this is that we examine all levels 
of government in a federal system. Looking at gross rather than net revenues and expenditures would 
result in double-counting of interjurisdictional transfers at both the grantor as well as the recipient 
government level.  
 
Table 1 and table 2 show the indicator matrices for primary expenditures and revenues. E. g. in the 
case of spending on "Jurisdiction and Prisons" the age group 50 - 65 is assigned a value of 0.6 whereas 
the age group 18-30 has the highest entry "1". This means that on the average per capita spending in 
this function on the age group 50 - 65 amounts to about 60% of per capita spending on the age group 
18 - 30. The entries in the function "Jurisdiction & Prison" have been derived by examining the age 
structure of prisoners as well as persons prosecuted for crime. In the case of income taxes, to take one 
example out of the revenue indicator matrix, inhabitants in the age group 30 - 50 make the highest per 
capita tax contributions. As compared to this age group, the age group 18 - 30 has an average per 
capita income tax burden that amounts to only about 31% of the age group 30 - 50.  
 
In figure 1 and figure 2 we show the age-cost profiles and age-revenue profiles across all functions by 
level of government based upon primary expenditure and revenue data for Germany in fiscal year 
2004. There is a considerable variation of per capita spending and revenue collection across the age 
groups within and across the different levels of government. As can be seen, age cost profiles of 
subnational governments (state and local government sector) are biased towards the young whereas the 
federal budget and in particular social security spending is strongly biased towards the elderly. This is 
not surprising because in Germany state and local governments are responsible for the provision of 
education - including kindergarten services - whereas the federal government makes only modest 
contributions to education financing. The high burden of the federal government for spending on the 
elderly is due to the massive transfers of the federal government to the public pension system. On the 
revenue side of the budget, age profiles are rather similar across all levels of government which is due 
  10to the income taxation and income-related social security contributions with the highest burden at the 
age 30-50. In addition, in Germany the bulk of tax revenues are collected out of joint taxes and the 
revenues from these joint taxes are shared among all levels of government.  
 
In figure 3 we present estimates of the net burden
11 of public service provision by age for the three 
layers of government which is calculated by: 
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Age groups which are net-beneficiaries of public service provision have a negative balance, s(x,f ) < 0 
whereas net-payers have a positive balance, s(x,f) > 0. As can be seen only the age groups 30 - 65 
have a significant net payer position whereas all other age groups are net recipients of public 
services.
12 Taking into account the decline in the labor force in Germany expected in the years ahead, 
figure 3 suggests that without changes in the level and structure of taxes and expenditures Germany 
might run into severe sustainability trouble without adjustments in policy, an issue which we will 
address below.  
 
IV. Empirical Application II: Demographics and Sustainability across levels of Government 
 
As many other industrialized countries Germany faces rather dramatic demographic changes in the 
decades ahead which poses the question, which challenges these changes imply for fiscal policy. In 
table 3 we present some background data on demographic developments in Germany. The most 
current population forecast
13, which is used throughout our investigation, suggests that the population 
in Germany will drop by about 5% in the period 2006 - 2030 with strong disparities between West 
Germany (about - 2.5%) and East Germany (about - 15%). Even more important is the change in the 
age structure of the population. The labor force - age group 18-65 - will drop from about 63% of the 
                                                 
11 Because expenditures cover primary expenditures only the net burden has to be looked upon as the primary 
balance. 
12 At the federal level the age group 18-30 has a modest net payer position. At the state and local level the age 
group 65-80 has a modest net-payer position. 
13 We use the average of variant 1-W1 and 1-W2 of the 11th population forecast of the Federal Statistical Office 
(2007a). 
  11population in 2006 to about 57% until the year 2030 and the share of the population in the age group 6 
- 28, which demands the services of the education sector ranging from schools to universities, will 
decrease by more than 4.5 percentage points. However, the most significant change we observe for the 
elderly, 65+, whose population share increases from about 20% to about 28% within a period of 25 
years.  
 
Thus, demographic shifts in Germany are quite significant and our age cost profiles derived in the 
preceding section suggests that this should have a quite different impact on the various levels of 
government. In our subsequent empirical application the federal structure of Germany is incorporated 
in our simulation model by taking into account the interactions between the different levels of 
government induced by the flow of funds between government levels. Interjurisdictional transfers 
create fiscal spillover effects between the various levels of government that are also affected by 
demographic changes. Thus for example the ageing of the society puts expenditure pressure on the 
social security system and because a considerable share of social security expenditures is financed out 
of tax financed transfers provided by the federal government, the federal budget is considerably 
affected fiscally, despite the fact that the federal government hardly provides any direct transfers to the 
elderly.
14 As table 4 shows, interjurisdictional vertical transfers are quite significant in Germany. In 
the upper part of the table we report transfer payments in terms of the total expenditures of the grantor 
government. About 45% of federal expenditures are transfers to the social security system (~ 32%) 
and the state government level (~ 13%). About 20% of state government expenditures are transfers to 
the local government level. In the lower part of the table transfers are reported from the point of view 
of recipient governments. About 14% of state expenditures are financed out of transfers from the 
federal government and more than 30% of local government expenditures are financed out of state 
transfers. The social security system covers almost 20% of total expenditures out of tax financed 
transfers provided by the federal government. 
 
                                                 
14 The only exception is the financing of pension payments for retired public servants of the federal government. 
  12General assumptions 
Based upon the estimated age profiles of expenditures and revenues derived above this section 
presents simulation results on the future development of the fiscal stance of the various levels of 
government in Germany covering the period up to 2030. We proceed in three steps: First we present 
simple simulation results that completely disregard policy changes and rest upon equation (4) on the 
expenditure side and an analogous equation for revenues. A second model simulation introduces a 
wide set of assumptions about policy changes that have already been implemented or are about to 
enter the legislation process. A third simulation adds the government budget restrictions and imposes a 
simple sustainability restriction, namely a balanced budget rule, and derives estimates of the room of 
maneuver of future generations. 
 
All subsequent simulations disregard general inflation and productivity growth and therefore the 
results have to be interpreted in real terms net of general economic growth. This is by no means a 
restrictive assumption because inflation and real economic growth is usually taken into account by 
assuming that revenue and expenditure growth keeps up with productivity growth across all revenue 
and expenditure items and thus growth is neutral with respect to the share of primary expenditures 
devoted to spending in the various functions. Sector effects that means effects upon the expenditure 
structure by function, arise only if we assume that in some functions price increases deviate from the 
general inflation rate
15 or that real expenditure growth in some functions is above or below general 
productivity growth because of policy priority shifts.
16 However, we have to admit that the tax 
revenue structure is not neutral with respect to productivity growth because there are both taxes which 
are highly correlated with GDP as well as taxes that are only weakly correlated with GDP, as for 
example tobacco tax, motor vehicle tax, real property tax, etc.
17 We estimate that at least about 85% of 
                                                 
15 It is frequently assumed that prices in the health sector increase faster than the general price index, see for 
example Lee and Edwards (2001). 
16 One should note, that neglecting productivity growth does not mean that we disregard growth let alone that we 
believe that there will be no real growth. Suppressing the effects of productivity growth merely implies that both 
expenditures as well as tax revenues - in per capita terms - rise at the rate of productivity growth, an assumption 
quite common in the literature, see for example Lee and Edwards (2001). 
17 Lee and Edwards (2001) assume that all tax revenues with the exception of property taxes rise with the rate of 
productivity growth. In Germany, property taxes are only of only small importance and amount to only about 
3.3% of total tax revenues (property tax plus tax on acquisition of real estate). 
  13tax revenues in Germany belong to the former category and thus our assumption of neutrality of the 
tax structure with respect to productivity growth is not that far fetched.  
 
Finally, we have to make some remarks on the social security system. Roughly
18 speaking the 
statutory social security system in Germany consists of five branches. The bulk of revenues of the 
social security system are compulsory contributions of employers and employees. In addition, the 
federal government pays tax financed transfers to the social security system and most of these transfers 
go to the statutory pension insurance. In our model simulation we assume that the federal government 
contributes a fixed ratio of net expenditures of the various branches of social security. Based upon data 
for the year 2004 we calculated the following ratios: 
•  Statutory occupational accident insurance ~ 2.3% 
•  Statutory health insurance ~ 1.7% 
•  Statutory long-term care insurance ~ 0% 
•  Statutory pension insurance ~ 49.7% 
•  Statutory unemployment insurance ~ 10.1%
19 
Using these transfer financing ratios, we introduce a link between social security and federal 
government spending. 
 
Model I: Naïve model simulations: Only demographics matter 
In a first step we take a "pure demographic view" ignoring behavioural and policy changes as well as 
the budget restriction. Thus we answer the question: Which fiscal performance are expected if age cost 
and revenue profiles are kept unchanged and changes in behaviour and politics are completely 
disregarded in the period 2004 - 2030?  
 
The results of this rather fictitious experiment are shown in figure 4 in terms of the primary balance as 
a percentage of net primary expenditure of the year 2004. The fiscal imbalances induced by 
                                                 
18 For a detailed description of the German social security system see the brochure "Social Security at a Glance", 
available at the homepage of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affaire, www.bmas.de. 
19 This ratio has been adjusted in 2007, which is taken into account in our policy simulations reported below. 
  14demographic change differ significantly across levels of governments. Subnational governments 
benefit fiscally from these changes, which is due to the fact that expenditures are biased toward the 
younger generations and thus the decline in the absolute number and the share of the younger 
generation results in expenditure savings taking per capita expenditures on each age group as given. 
The "demographic dividend" amounts to about 5% of net primary expenditures until 2030 and the 
projected decline of public revenues is more than compensated by savings in the education sector that 
are due to the shrinking of the young age cohorts that attend schools and universities. In addition, as 
can be seen from the age cost profiles presented above, local and state governments do not have to pay 
for the elderly that much and consequently the increase of the share of the elderly does not affect the 
subnational government sector significantly.
20 In contrast, the federal government level faces a 
demographically induced fiscal deficit, which increases steadily to about 12% of net primary 
expenditures at the federal level until 2030. A similar picture, but even more dramatic, arises for the 
social security system. The shift of the age structure towards the elderly leads to an enormous burden 
for the social security budgets. The demographic gap is estimated to increase to about 25% of net 
expenditures until 2030. Thus, demographic change has a considerable impact on the overall public 
budget, mainly caused by expenditure pressure in the social security system and results in significant 
vertical fiscal imbalances in the German federal system. These imbalances ask for changes in the 
vertical distribution of tax revenues and indicate that - without changes in service provision - social 
security contributions or tax financed transfers to the social security system have to increase 
considerably. However, we once again have to stress that these results have been derived from a 
highly stylized comparative static experiment that identifies "pure demographic change effects". 
Behavioural changes, policy changes etc. are completely disregarded. Therefore, in a next experiment 
we relax these very restrictive assumptions. 
 
Model II: Policy simulations without imposing sustainability restrictions 
After examining the pure demographic change case we next take into account changes in behaviour 
and politics but do not yet impose a sustainability restriction which will be introduced in the next 
                                                 
20 The only exception is the increase in the number of retired public servants especially at the state level, which 
pushes up state spending on pension payments for retired public servants. 
  15subsection. We start with the formulation of a set of 11 assumptions for our policy simulations. 
Assumptions 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and parts of assumption 9 are in fact no assumptions but merely quantify the 
effects of policy measures that have already been introduced or are currently in the legislation process, 
such as the increase in kindergarten services. Most of our assumptions on reforms in the social 
security system as well as the unemployment rate are adapted from Werding and Kaltschütz (2004) 




Assumption 1: The value added tax rate has been increased on Jan. 1st in 2007 from 16% to 19%. This 
increase was associated with a change in the distribution of sales tax revenues in favor of the federal 
government which uses the additional tax revenues to increase tax financed transfers to the 
unemployment insurance to finance a cut of the contribution rate of employers and employees to the 
unemployment insurance.  
Assumption 2: In the 70s about 12% of the population aged 20-28 studied at universities. The current 
ratio is about 26% and is forecasted to increase to about 31% up to the year 2015.
21 We assume that 
this is accommodated by an increase in real per capita expenditures in the function „university“ and 
„research outside universities“ by 20% at the state and federal government level until 2030. 
Assumption 3: Relative spending on pensions for retired public servants will decrease by 23% at the 
federal level and increase by about 39% at the state level whereas there is no significant change at the 
local government level.
22 
Assumption 4: Since late 2005 the German economy is on an economic recovery path and there has 
been a considerable drop in the unemployment rate. We assume that the reduction in the 
unemployment rate will result in savings in social assistance expenditures, the bulk of which has to be 
covered by the local government sector. We assume that these expenditures drop by 10% per capita up 
to 2012 and will remain at this lower level until the end of the simulation period.   
                                                 
21 Because of the German vocational education system university enrollment in Germany is lower as compared 
to many other OECD countries. 
22 These figures result out of the changing relation of retired public servants and the population 65+. Estimates 
are derived from the most recent forecast on retirement in the public sector provided by the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior (2005). 
  16Assumption 5: A legislation process has been started to increase kindergarten service provision for 
children below the age of 3. Despite the fact that local governments are responsible for the provision 
of kindergarten services a recent draft bill puts the burden of financing this policy measure on the 
federal and state government sector whereas the local government sector will have to cover only 
negligible costs. In table 5 we specify the fiscal flows in detail.
23  
Assumption 6: Since 1990 the East German states receive considerable transfers from the federal 
government to finance the reconstruction of the public infrastructure capital stock. These transfers are 
steadily reduced and will expire in 2019. Therefore we reduce federal expenditures - according to the 
rules fixed in a federal law - by 12.6 bn. Euro until 2019. In addition we reduce revenues and 
expenditures of the East German states by 1.2 bn. Euro until 2019 because of the decline in transfers 
received from the EU. On the other hand, we increase per capita tax revenues of the East German local 
government sector. Currently per capita local tax revenues in East Germany amount to about 60% of 
the West German average value and we assume that this ratio will increase linearly to 75% in 2030. 
Assumption 7:  Interest rates are currently at a historical low level. We assume an increase in the real 
interest rate on government bonds by 1 percentage point up to the year 2015.
24  
Assumption 8: In recent years there have been many reforms in the statutory pension insurance system 
the effects of which will become effective in our simulation period. Calculations by Werding and 
Kaltschütz (2004) show that per capita benefits of the pension insurance system will drop by about 
15% until the year 2030. This assumption is also carried over to pension payments for retired public 
servants. In addition, recent legislation increased retirement age by about 2 years until the year 2030 
which will have three fiscal effects: i) Per capita pension payments to retired persons decrease in real 
terms, ii) income tax payments increase and iii) social security contributions increase where the latter 
two result out of the longer working life. These three effects are taken into account in our 
simulations.
25 
                                                 
23 The legislation process to improve kindergarten services for children below the age of 3 has already started 
and the figures presented in table 5 correspond to those discussed in the legislation process. The very 
complicated legislation process and the scheduled financing are described in more detail in Seitz (2008). 
24 This assumption does not affect the results in our model II simulations because we look at primary 
expenditures only. However, in our model III simulations this assumption is relevant for determining residual 
primary expenditure growth. 
25 Currently, in German politics is discussed abandoning some of these reform steps which might result in a 
reduction of the quite significant reform effects introduced in recent years. However, it is virtually impossible to 
  17Assumption 9: Many adjustments have also been made in the unemployment insurance system which 
contributed to a reduction in benefit payments. In addition there has been a change in the financing 
scheme because on Jan. 1st 2007 the unemployment contribution rate has been reduced form 6.5% to 
4.2%. The associated loss in revenues has been compensated by an increase in federal transfers to the 
unemployment insurance which are financed out of the increased sales tax rate which became effective 
concurrently. We take these changes into account and in addition, we follow Werding and Kaltschütz 
(2004) and assume a significant drop of the unemployment rate in Germany to about 4% up to the year 
2010. This results in i) declining unemployment compensations, ii) increasing income tax payments 
increase and iii) increasing social security contributions. These three effects are taken into account in 
our simulations. 
Assumption 10: Whereas there have been many reforms in the public pension system in the health 
insurance system reforms are rather difficult to achieve by policy makers and therefore no policy 
assumptions are taken into account in this branch of the social security system. However, the literature 
intensively discusses the change in health expenditures that might occur because of changes in life 
expectations as well as the impact of technological change on health expenditures. In our simulations 
we follow the literature, see for example Lee and Edwards (2001), and assume that the prices for 
health services increase by 1% above the GDP deflator. In addition, we adapt the assumption of 
Werding (2007) and assume a flattening of the age cost structure in health services because of the 
increase in longevity by about 1.2 years until the year 2030.  
Assumption 11: Reforms in the long-term care insurance system are permanently discussed in 
Germany but did not yet result in concrete legislation processes.
26 However, as in the health insurance 
system we take into account the flattening of the age cost profile induced by the increase in longevity. 
 
Table 5 summarizes our assumption and provides information on the technical implementation of the 
assumed policy changes.
27 Our simulation results are depicted for each level of government 
                                                                                                                                                          
evaluate the long-run impact of this change in policy and therefore we stick to the institutional settings valid in 
2007.  
26 A legislation process to reform the long-term care insurance system has been initiated quite recently in spring 
2008. These reform measures are not taken into account in our policy simulations. 
  18separately. In figure 5 we compare fiscal developments in the social security system in model I and 
model II. In our policy simulations the deficit of the social security system is significantly reduced as 
compared to model I which disregards all changes in politics and does not take into account the 
improved growth conditions of the German economy.
28 In the short-run, the change in the financing of 
the unemployment insurance system results in a downward shift of net expenditures and net revenues 
in the year 2007 as compared to the previous years. The flattening of the expenditure growth path is 
largely due to the reduction of pension benefits as well as the assumed drop in the unemployment rate. 
Model I and II have dramatically different implications for federal transfers to the social security 
system. Whereas in model I these transfers increase by about 25% in the period
29 2007 - 2030 model 
II predicts a vertically stagnating transfer volume. 
 
Next we turn to the federal government level, see figure 6. Due to the increase in the VAT rate in 2007 
and the increase in tax financed transfers to the unemployment insurance (see assumption 1) both net 
primary expenditures and net revenues increased significantly in 2007. In the next years real 
expenditures - net of productivity growth effects - are forecasted to decrease significantly for several 
reasons. A very important factor is the expiring of the transfer payments to the East German states in 
2019 which amount currently to about 4% of federal expenditures. Another major effect is the decline 
in transfers to the social security system, especially the statutory pension insurance system, see 
assumption 8. Net revenues remain rather stable in the period 2007 - 2020 but decrease slightly in the 
following years due to demographic developments. Whereas in model I the net primary balance 
deteriorated throughout the simulation period in model II there is a steady improvement, which is due 
to declining primary expenditures and in the years after 2020 a surplus of 5% is expected. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
27 We have to admit that we are not able to incorporate one important policy change that occurred in 2005. In 
2005 the financing and "rules of the game" for the provision of social assistance has been changed considerably. 
Official statistic do not yet provide a sufficiently serious data base to study the impact of this reform on federal 
and subnational government finances and we therefore have to disregard this reform at our current stage of 
research. 
28 However, expenditure growth of the various branches of the social security system is rather heterogeneous. 
Thus for example, real expenditure growth of the health insurance and long-term care insurance increase by 
about 40% up to 2030 whereas expenditure growth in the pension insurance system is rather modest due to the 
reforms that have already been introduced. 
29 Because of the shift in the financing structure of the unemployment insurance in 2007 comparison is restricted 
to this period. 
  19At the state level, see figure 7, net primary expenditures in model I and II do not deviate that much. 
Net primary expenditures in model II are about 3 percentage points above expenditures forecasted in 
model I because of the assumed increase in resources devoted to university education and research as 
well as the increase in kindergarten services. Large differences we get at the revenue side because of 
the increase in the VAT rate as well as the general tax revenue increase resulting out of the current 
speed-up of growth in the German economy. Consequently the primary balance in model II is 
significantly improved as compared to model I. This is also in accordance with the most recent 
developments at the state level because in 2007 most states already presented a balanced budget.  
 
The simulation results for the local government level look rather similar to those at the state 
government level but the calculated surplus is much higher, see figure 8. The primary balance steadily 
increases to about 18% of total net primary expenditures and by comparing the development of 
revenues and expenditures in model I and II we see that demographics is the most important factor that 
drives down expenditures and contributes to the primary balance surplus. 
 
Finally, we compare the fiscal performance of the federal government sector and the total subnational 
government sector (local plus state government sector) to check whether fiscal imbalances arise. 
Figure 9 shows that the subnational government sector can improve the primary balance significantly 
by almost 400 Euro per capita up to the year 2030 whereas the federal government can achieve a 
surplus of only about 150 Euro per capita. This results in differences in the political room for 
maneuver at the federal and subnational government level.  
 
Model III: Imposing sustainability restrictions 
Whereas in model I and II no sustainability restriction has been taken into account, model III imposes 
a balanced budget. We assume that federal, state and local government have a balanced budget as from 
2010 in each year. As set out in equation (8) this restriction is achieved by adjusting net primary 
expenditures. In the social security system we impose the reasonable restriction that a balanced budget 
is achieved by adjusting compulsory social security contribution rates. As a matter of course, an 
  20increase in spending pressure will also put pressure on the provision of benefits. Thus, imbalances in 
the budgets of the social security system could be avoided by both spending and revenue adjustments. 
However, assumptions on expenditure adjustments would be rather vague and therefore we consider 
revenue adjustments only.  
 
To take the most recent developments in Germany into account - strong increase in real growth as well 
as tax revenues - our sustainability calculations start with the fiscal year 2007 and use a preliminary 
estimate of the total budget balance at each level of government. In the period 2008 - 2010 we adjust 
primary expenditures such that the budget deficit is steadily decreased and a balanced budget is 
achieved in 2010. Using our method described in section II, we can decompose the growth rate of 
primary expenditures into three components: primary expenditure growth induced i) by demographic 
change, ii) by politics and iii) residual primary expenditure growth. Similarly, we can decompose the 
growth rate of net revenues in a demographic and policy induced component. However, in the social 
security system residual primary expenditure growth is zero by assumption because sustainability is 
achieved by adjusting social security contributions and thus in this sector there is a third component of 
revenue growth, namely revenue growth necessary to achieve sustainability. 
 
Table 6 presents the decomposition of revenue and expenditure growth by level of government in the 
period 2007 - 2030. Revenues and expenditures of the social security system increase by 8.0%. Net 
revenues decrease by almost 10% due to demographic changes. The various policy measures 
introduced as well as the assumptions on improved economic conditions in Germany result in an 
increase by about 14%. However, to achieve sustainability a further increase of revenues by an upward 
adjustment of social security contributions by about 4% is necessary. Expenditures increase by over 
16% due to the ageing of the German society whereas policy measures bring about an expenditure 
decrease by about 8.2%. 
 
Revenues at all levels of government will be affected negatively by demographic change whereas 
policy induced measures result in an increase in revenues. However, the total effects on revenue 
  21growth are rather limited. At the federal government level revenues decrease by 3.0% and by about 
2.3% at the local government level. At the state government level the negative demographic effects 
and the positive policy-induced effects almost balance and leave revenues virtually unaffected.  
 
On the expenditure side the effects are much more significant and diverse across the various levels of 
government. At the federal level, demographic change puts strong pressure on primary expenditures 
growth (+ 5.6%) whereas at the state and local government level expenditures drop by 6.9% and 9.1%, 
respectively. These differences are due to the change in the age structure towards the elderly and the 
fact that federal expenditures are biased towards the older generations whereas subnational 
government expenditures have a youth bias. Policy-induced effects are quite strong at the federal 
government level and amount to almost -15%. The two factors that contribute most to the 
improvement of the fiscal stance of the federal budget are the reforms introduced in the pension 
insurance system and the phasing-out of transfer payments to the East German states. At the state 
government level, policy measures do have only a minor impact on primary expenditure growth and at 
the local government level primary expenditures decrease by about 3%, which is due to the assumed 
drop in welfare spending induced by the decline in unemployment.  
 
Strong asymmetries we observe for residual primary expenditure growth. Whereas the local 
government sector can increase primary expenditures in the period 2007 - 2030 by about 16% and the 
state government sector by about 0.2%, the federal government level has to introduce further cuts in 
primary expenditures by about 1.3% in order to ensure sustainability. Total net primary expenditures 
have to be cut by about 10% at the federal level and by about 4% at the state level whereas local 
governments can increase primary expenditures by about 4%.  
 
From these results we can draw several policy-relevant conclusions:  
1) Demographic developments create windows of opportunity to realize expenditure savings without 
reducing per capita benefits of the relevant age groups at the subnational government level in 
Germany. However, governments have to adjust the volume of expenditure in each function to 
  22changing cohort sizes. As a matter of course, we are well aware of the fact that in the short run this is 
not possible without creating severe frictions because staff downsizing or adjusting infrastructures is 
not that easy and cannot be achieved instantly. However, within a period of 20 years these adjustments 
have to be manageable especially because the facts about demographic change are well-known to 
policy makers. At the federal government level and especially in the social security system 
demographics put further upward pressure on expenditures and social security contribution rates.  
2) Policy measures as well as the expected economic recovery contribute to an improvement in the 
fiscal stance of all public sector budgets. Reforms introduced in the social security system in Germany 
in recent years have indeed contributed to an improvement of sustainability conditions. However, 
according to our simulation results there is still need for reforms because a further increase in social 
security contribution rates would be necessary. The rather small policy-induced increase in state 
government spending is caused by the assumed increase in real resource provision in the university 
system and the increase in kindergarten service provision. Thus these policy measures do not reduce 
the room for maneuver of future generations significantly at the state level.  
3) From a political perspective a rather critical result is the fact that our simulation results suggest 
significant vertical fiscal imbalances across the various levels of government. The federal government 
has to cut primary expenditures by 10.3% and at the state level an expenditure cut by about 4.1% is 
necessary whereas the local government sector can increase primary expenditures by 4.1%. If no 
corrections in the vertical distribution of revenues are introduced, the share of federal government 
spending, see table 7, will in the period 2007 - 2030 drop by more than 2.6%, whereas the state and 
local government spending share increases by about 0.6% and 2.0% respectively. Thus the crucial 
(political) question is which level of government should be enabled to set new future spending 
priorities and thus requests a higher share of total government resources.  
 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The paper introduced a simple method to study the impact of demographic change on the fiscal stance 
of governments in a federal system. We estimated age cost and revenue profiles for Germany by level 
  23of government and used these estimates to derive simulation results on the future development of 
public finances. In a first step, we studied the impact of pure demographic change showing that the 
federal government and especially the social security system will experience a deterioration of fiscal 
conditions whereas the subnational government sector can realize a demographic dividend. In a second 
step we incorporated policy reforms as well as assumptions on changes in the demand for public 
services to inspect the question, whether recent policy reforms will contribute to an improvement of 
fiscal conditions. Our simulation results suggest that recent policy reforms as well as the currently 
observed improvement in general economic conditions significantly reduced the pressure on fiscal 
budgets. In a final step, we incorporated our method into a simple model of fiscal sustainability and 
calculated expenditure adjustments necessary to keep public budgets balances. 
 
The main conclusion from our study is the fact, that demographics have quite different effects upon 
public budgets of the different layers of government in a federal system. Because of the ageing of the 
society, governments which have an expenditure biased towards the elderly will live to see a 
worsening of the political room for maneuver whereas governments with a focus on the younger 
generations gain scope for political action. Thus the tendency towards vertical fiscal imbalances in the 
German federal system also creates political vertical fiscal imbalances.  
 
As a matter of course, our approach has some shortcomings that have to be addressed by future 
research. Our simple indicator matrix used to estimate the distribution of expenditures and revenues 
across various age groups can be refined or substituted for example by econometric estimates. In 
addition, we did not take into account feedback effects between the public and the private sector of the 
economy. One should expect that changes in social security contribution rates affect wage costs and 
thus repercussions on the labor market and on economic developments and tax revenues to be of some 
importance. These shortcomings suggest that simulations should be run within the framework of a 
general equilibrium model. Another issue is the fact that with the exception of our ad-hoc assumption 
on university attendance, cohort affects are virtually neglected. This means, that our simulations rest 
upon the assumption of almost identical behavior of present and future generations. However, 
  24modeling cohort behavior is not an easy business and far beyond the scope of the present study but has 
to be addressed by future research. Despite these shortcoming we believe, that the study contributes to 
our understanding of the channels by which fiscal effects induced by demographic change work 
through the highly interrelated budgets of governments in federal systems.  
  25References 
 
Auerbach, Alan J.; Gokhale, Jagadeesh and Kotlikoff, Laurence J. (1991), Generational Accounts: a meaningful 
alternative to deficit accounting, Tax policy and the economy 5, 55-110.  
Auerbach, Alan J.; Gokhale, Jagadeesh and Kotlikoff, Laurence J. (1994), Generational Accounts: a meaningful 
way to evaluate fiscal policy, Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, 73-94.  
Auerbach, Alan J. and Kotlikoff, Laurence J. (1987), Dynamic Fiscal Policy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Bach, Stefan; Bork, Christhart; Krimmer, Pascal; Raffelhüschen, Bernd and Schulz, Erika (2002), 
Demographischer Wandel und Steueraufkommen, Report prepared for the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
DIW Materialien No. 20.  
Batini, Nicoletta; Callen, Tim and McKibbin, Warwick J. (2006), The global impact of demographic change, 
IMF Working Paper No. 06/9. 
Baum, Britta and Seitz, Helmut (2003), Demographie und öffentliche Bildungsausgaben in Deutschland: Eine 
empirische Untersuchung für die westdeutschen Flächenländer, Vierteljahreshefte für 
Wirtschaftsforschung  2/2003, 205-219. 
Blanchard, Olivier J. (1990), Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators, OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper No. 79. 
Boadway, Robin and Tremblay, Jean-François (2006), A Theory of Vertical Fiscal Imbalances, Queen’s 
Economics Department Working Paper No. 1072. 
Börsch-Supan, Axel (2000), A model under siege: A case study of the German retirement 
insurance system, Economic Journal 110, F24-F45. 
Brunner, Eric and Balsdon, Ed (2003), Intergenerational Conflict and the Political Economy of School Spending, 
Journal of Urban Economics 56, 369-388. 
Conference Board of Canada (2002), Fiscal prospects for the federal and provincial/territorial governments: 
Economic performance and trends, Ottawa. 
Cutler, David M.; Elmendorf, Douglas W. and Zeckhauser, Richard J. (1993), Demographic composition and 
the public bundle, Public Finance 1993, 178-198. 
Disney, Richard (2007), Population ageing and the size of the welfare state: Is there a puzzle to explain?, 
European Journal of Political Economy 23, 542–553. 
Echevarría, Cruz A. (1995), On age distribution of population government expenditure and fiscal federalism, 
Journal of Population Economics 8, 301-313. 
Echevarría, Cruz A. and Iza, Amaia (2006), Life expectancy, human capital, social security and growth, Journal 
of Public Economics 90, 2323-2349. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2007a), Germany’s Population by 2050 – Results of the 11th coordinated 
population projection, Wiesbaden.  
Franco, Daniela and Munzi, Teresa (1997), Ageing and fiscal policies in the European Union, in European 
Commission’s Directorate General For Economic and Financial Affairs (ed), The welfare state in Europe: 
Challenges and reforms -  European Economy, Reports and Studies No.4, Brussels,  239-388. 
Galor, Oded (2005), The Demographic Transition and the Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth, Journal of 
the European Economic Association 3, 494-504. 
Gruber, Jonathan and Wise, David (2001), An international perspective on policies for an aging society, NBER-
Working Paper No. 8103. 
Harris, Amy R.; Evans, William N., Schwab, Robert M. (2001), Education spending in an aging America. 
Journal of Public Economics 81, 449-472. 
Hondroyiannis, George and Papapetrou, Evangelia (2000), Do demographic changes affect fiscal developments?, 
Public Finance Review 28, 468-488.  
Lazar, Harvey; St-Hilaire, France and Tremblay, Jean-François (2003), Vertical fiscal imbalance: Myth or 
reality? In H. Lazar and F. St-Hilaire (eds.) Money, politics and health care. Reconstructing the federal-
provincial partnership, Kingston, 135-188. 
Lee, Ronald D. and Edwards, Ryan D. (2001), The fiscal impact of population change, in J. S. Little and R.K. 
Triest (eds.), Seismic shifts: The economic impact of demographic change, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston conference Series No. 46, Boston, 220-237. 
Lindh, Thomas and Malmberg, Bo (1999), Age structure effects and growth in the OECD, 1950-1990, Journal of 
Population Economics 12, 431-449. 
OECD (2006), OECD Economic Studies: Germany, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Pearson, Mark; Smith, Stephen and White, Stuart (1989), Demographic influences on public spending. Fiscal 
Studies 10 (2), 48-65 
Poterba, James M. (1997), Demographic structure and the political economy of public education, Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 16, 48-66. 
  26Roig, Gemma A. (2006), Population Ageing and the Sustainability of the Spanish National Health System: Some 
Financial Policy Alternatives, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice 31, 557-580. 
Ruggeri, Guiseppe C. (2001), A federation out of balance. Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat 
(CICS). 
Sanz, Ismael and Velázquez, Francisco J. (2007), The role of ageing in the growth of government and social 
welfare spending in the OECD,  European Journal of Political Economy 23, 917-931. 
Seitz, Helmut (2007), The Impact of Demographic Change on Fiscal Policy in Germany, in I. Hamm, H. Seitz 
and M. Werding (eds.), Demographic Change in Germany: The Economic and Fiscal Consequences, 
Springer, Berlin, 129-164 . 
Seitz, Helmut (2008), Die Demographieabhängigkeit der Ausgaben und Einnahmen der öffentlichen Haushalte: 
Eine empirische Analyse unter Berücksichtigung der föderalen Verflechtungen, Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 
Gütersloh. 
Seitz, Helmut and Kempkes, Gerhard (2007), Fiscal Federalism and Demography, Public Finance Review 35, 
385-413. 
van Ewijk, Casper; Draper, Nick; ter Rele, Harry and Westerhout, Ed (2006), Ageing and the Sustainability of 
Dutch Public Finances, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, CPB Special 
Publications, No. 61. 
Werding, Martin (2007), Social Insurance: How to Pay for Pension and Health Care?, in I. Hamm, H. Seitz and 
M. Werding (eds.), Demographic Change in Germany: The Economic and Fiscal Consequences, 
Springer, Berlin, 89-128. 
Werding, Martin and Kaltschütz, Anita (2005), Modellrechnungen zur langfristigen Tragfähigkeit der 
öffentlichen Finanzen, Ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung 17, München. 
Zhang, Jie and Zhang, Junsen (2005), The Effect of Life Expectancy on fertility, Saving, Schooling and 





Centre for Cultural Research (2005): „8. KulturBarometer“, Bonn. 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2005): „Grund und Strukturdaten 2003/2004“, Berlin. 
Federal Ministry of Health (2007): „Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung“, Berlin.  
Federal Ministry of the Interior (2005): „Dritter Versorgungsbericht der Bundesregierung“. Berlin, Germany. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2003a): „Sozialhilfe - Hilfe in besonderen Lebenslagen Fachserie 13 
Reihe 2.2 - 2002“, Wiesbaden. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2003b): „Sozialhilfe - Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt Fachserie 13 Reihe 2.1 
– 2002“, Wiesbaden. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2004): „Bildung und Kultur – Studierende an Hochschulen 
Wintersemester 2003/2004, Fachserie 11 Reihe 4.1 – 2004“, Wiesbaden. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2005a): “Verkehr – Unfälle im Straßenverkehr nach Geschlecht 2004“, 
Wiesbaden. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2005b): “Gerichtsverfahren an Zivil-, Familien-, Strafgerichten / 
Staatsanwaltschaften 2004“, Wiesbaden. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2006a): “Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe 2003 - Aufwendungen 
privater Haushalte für den Privaten Konsum“, Wiesbaden.     
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2006b): “Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe 2003 - Einnahmen und 
Ausgaben privater Haushalte“, Wiesbaden. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2006c): “Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe 2003 - Aufwendungen 
privater Haushalte für Nahrungsmittel, Getränke und Tabakwaren“, Wiesbaden. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2007b): “Sterbetafel 2004/2006 Deutschland”, Wiesbaden. 
The German Pension Fund (2006a), „Versicherungspflichtig Beschäftigte im Berichtsjahr 2004“, Berlin. 
The German Pension Fund (2006b), „Rentenbestand am 31.12.2004“, Berlin. 
German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) (2005): „Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2004“, Wiesbaden. 
German Federal Social Insurance Authority (2006): „Fachinformationen, Risikostrukturausgleich, 
Jahresausgleich“ , Bonn. 
German Federal Labor Office (2007): “Sonderauswertung – Arbeitslosengeld und durchschnittliche 
Anspruchshöhe  - 2004”, Nürnberg. 
German Statutory Accident Insurance (2007): „Leistungsempfänger und -umfang nach Alter des 
Leistungsempfängers“, Sankt Augustin. 
 
 
  27Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1 Indicator matrix for primary expenditures for Germany 
 
  age group 
Function  0-6  6-18  18-30  30-50  50-65  65-80  80+ 
General  public  services/administration  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Defense  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Public  order  &  safety  0.33 0.57 1.00 0.63 0.48 0.40 0.38 
Jurisdiction  &  prison  0.51 0.68 1.00 0.73 0.62 0.56 0.54 
Schools  0.00 1.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kindergarten  1.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Universities  0.00 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
All  other  education    0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Research  outside  universities  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Culture    0.23 0.35 0.55 1.00 0.96 0.76 0.30 
Health  and  environmental  protection  0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
Housing  &  community  amenities  0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.20 
Agriculture,  forestry  &  fishing  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Fuel  &  energy  &  water  0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.20 
Transportation  &  communication  0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.20 
Economic  affairs/property  administration  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Pensions  for  retired  public  servants  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.63 1.00 
Administration  of  social  welfare    1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Transfers  to  the  pension  system  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.25 1.00 0.78 
transfers to the social security system  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.50  0.20 
Social  assistance  1.00 0.58 0.43 0.48 0.36 0.27 0.77 
Youth  welfare  0.20 1.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Support  for  families  and  mothers  1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other  social  welfare    1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
unconditional transfers to other levels of 
government  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Other  expenditures  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Pension  insurance    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.25 1.00 0.78 
Casualty  insurance  0.00 0.01 0.17 0.39 0.71 1.00 0.90 
Health  insurance  0.25 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.38 0.72 1.00 
Unemployment  insurance  0.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 
Long  term  care  insurance  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.23 1.00 











  28Table 2 Indicator matrix for revenues for Germany 
 
  age group 
Category  0-6  6-18  18-30  30-50  50-65  65-80  80+ 
Income  tax    (J)  0.00 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.94 0.25 0.21 
Corporation  tax  (J)  0.00 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.94 0.25 0.21 
Value-added  tax  (J)  0.33 0.33 0.82 0.97 1.00 0.93 0.88 
Trade  tax  (J)  0.00 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.93 0.25 0.21 
Tax  on  interest  rebate  (J)  0.00 0.00 0.24 0.83 1.00 0.96 0.93 
Insurance  tax  (F)  0.00 0.00 0.52 0.95 1.00 0.67 0.57 
Tobacco tax (F)  0.00  0.00 1.00 0.87 0.82 0.24 0.00 
Coffee  tax  (F)  0.00 0.00 0.42 0.78 0.96 0.88 1.00 
Monopoly  on  brandy  (F)  0.00 0.00 0.45 0.73 1.00 0.83 0.00 
Sparkling  wine  tax  (F)  0.00 0.00 0.45 0.73 1.00 0.83 0.00 
Petroleum  tax  (F)  0.09 0.09 0.92 1.00 0.83 0.53 0.31 
Solidarity surcharge (F)
1  0.00 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.94 0.25 0.21 
Other  federal  taxes    (F)  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Inheritance  tax  (S)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.89 1.00 
Motor  vehicle  tax  (S)  0.19 0.19 0.82 1.00 0.97 0.85 0.74 
Beer  tax  (S)  0.00 0.00 0.45 0.73 1.00 0.83 0.00 
Other  state  taxes  (S)  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Property  tax  (L)  0.26 0.26 0.32 0.64 1.00 0.85 0.70 
Other  local  tax  (L)  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Other  duties  and  taxes  0.00  00.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Other revenue items
2  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Pension  insurance  contributions  0.00 0.00 0.52 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 
Casualty  insurance  contributions  0.00 0.00 0.46 1.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 
Health  insurance  contributions  0.00 0.00 0.49 1.00 0.80 0.70 0.55 
Unemployment  insurance  contributions  0.00 0.00 0.46 1.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 
Long  term  care  insurance  contributions  0.00 0.00 0.49 1.00 0.80 0.70 0.55 
Note: J=Joint taxes, F= pure federal taxes, S=pure state taxes, L=pure local taxes 
1 This is a surcharge on income taxes introduced to finance German unification.  
2 User fees etc. 
















  29Table 3 Age structure of the German population (%-share of total population) 
 
Age groups  2006  2010  2020  2030 
0-6 5.2% 4.9% 4.9% 4.6% 
6-18 12.2% 11.3% 10.1% 10.1% 
18-30 14.2% 14.3% 12.8% 11.5% 
30-50 30.3% 28.9% 25.2% 25.0% 
50-65 18.4% 20.0% 24.0% 20.4% 
65-80 15.2% 15.3% 15.7% 20.2% 
80+ 4.6% 5.2% 7.3% 8.0% 
labor force
1 62.9% 63.3% 62.0% 56.9% 
age group 6-28  24.1% 23.2% 20.5% 19.5% 
age dependency ratio
2 19.8% 20.5% 23.0% 28.3% 
total dependency ratio
3 37.1% 36.7% 38.0% 43.1% 
total population in 1.000  82.299 81.962 80.692 78.480 
1age group 18-65 years   
2 age group 65+   
3 age group 0-18 years and 65+ 
Source: Calculated from the 11th population forecast of the Federal Statistical Office (2007). Calculations are 




Table 4 Flow of transfers between the levels of government in Germany in 2004
1 
 
Transfers paid in % of total expenditures of the grantor government level 
 
recipient government level   
grantor ↓ 
transfer  paid in % 






















state gov.  24.4%  1.2%  2.9%  20.1%  0.2% 
local  gov.  1.0% 0.1%  2.8% 0.0%  0.1% 
social security system  0.0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Transfers received in % of total expenditures of the recipient government level 
 
grantor government level  recipient government 
level ↓ 
transfers received in 
% of total 
expenditures 
federal  state  local gov.  social 
security 
federal gov.  0.9%  0.0%  0.9%  0.0%  0.0% 
state government 
thereof: 


















local gov.  32.1%  0.5%  31.6%  0.0%  0.5% 
social security system  18.9%  18.9%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
1 Expenditures are measured in terms of gross rather than net expenditures. 








  30Table 5: Outline of the policy assumptions 
 
Assumption  short description 
1. Increase of the VAT 
rate on January. 1st. 
2007 
λr for VAT is set to 1.1875 at the federal level and 1.125 at the state and local 
government level as from 2007.  
2. Increase in student 
enrollment in 
universities 
In the function "Universities" and "Research" the λe is linearly increased from 1 to 1.2 
in 2015. 
3. Changing ratio of 
retired public sector 
servants and the elderly 
65+  
In the function "Pensions for retired public servants" the adjustment parameter λe is 
changed to take into account the changing number of retired public servants in relation 
to the elderly. 65+. Up to the year 2030 at the federal level λe decreases to 0.77 and at 
the state level λe  increases to 1.39. At the local government level no change is 
assumed.  
4. Economic recovery 
and decline in welfare 
expenditures 
Due to the currently observed recovery of the German economy we assume a decrease 
in welfare spending - especially social assistance expenditures - reducing λe in this 
function from 1.0 in 2007 to 0.9 in 2019. 
5. Improving the 
provision of 
kindergarten services 
for children below the 
age of 3 
i) In the period 2008 - 2013 the federal government provides investment grants for 
kindergarten infrastructure investment of 360 mill. Euro per year. Additional net 
investment expenditures arise also at the state (335 mill. Euro p.a.) and local 
government level (133 mill. Euro p.a.). These expenditures are assigned to the age 
group 0-6. 
ii) The federal government supports the increase in kindergarten service provision by 
redistributing tax revenues to the state government sector. This amount increases to 
770 mill. Euro up to the year 2014 and will be kept at this amount in the following 
year. Symmetrically revenues of the state government sector as well as expenditures 
are adjusted by the same amount.  
iii) Net expenditures on kindergarten services at the state level increase to about 2.6 
bn. Euo in the year 2014 and slightly decrease in the following years. These 
expenditures are assigned to the age group 0-6.  
6. Transfer payments to 
East German states 
i) The federal government reduces the volume of transfers to support infrastructure 
investment in East Germany as set out in a federal law in 2002 (a reduction of 12.6 bn 
Euro up to 2019). 
ii) Due to the cut of transfers from the EU to the East German states. there is a 
reduction of both revenues and expenditures by about 1.2 bn. Euro up to 2019. 
iii) Per capita tax revenues of local governments in East Germany in relation to West 
Germany increase by about 25% up to 2030. This implies that λr for local tax revenues 
in Germany increase from 1 to about 1.039 up to the year 2030. 
7. Interest rate increase  The real interest rate on government debt is linearly increased by 1 % up to the year 
2015. 
8. Reduced pension 
benefits and increase of 
the retirement age 
i) In the function "Pension insurance" the parameter λe is reduced from 1 to 0.85 in the 
year 2030. 
ii) The increase of the retirement age reduces the number of pension recipients in the 
age group 65-80 which is taken into account by reducing the parameter λe in the 
function "Pension insurance" for the age group 65-80 from 1 to 0.84 in the year 2030.  
iii) Increasing the retirement age corresponds to an increase in social security 
contributions of the relevant age group which we achieve by introducing an 
adjustment parameter on the revenue side of all social security systems. The same 
procedure is applied to income tax revenues. 
9. Effects of a reduced 
unemployment rate 
i) A strong and sustainable reduction of the unemployment rate is assumed which 
lowers expenditures of the unemployment insurance. The corresponding λr-parameter 
is reduced to 0.35 up to 2030. 
ii) The decrease in the unemployment rate results in higher income tax revenues which 
we take into account by adjusting the corresponding λr-parameter to 1.12 for the age 
group 18-65 up to the year 2030. Similarly we take into account the increase in social 
security contributions.  
iii) On Jan. 1st 2007 the contribution rate to the unemployment insurance has been 
reduced from 6.5% to 4.2%. 
10. Health insurance  i) Health expenditures increase by 1% above the GDP inflation rate. 
ii) The increased longevity is taken into account by a flattening of the age cost profile 
which is achieved by introducing an adjustment factor for the age group 80+ which 
decreases from 1 in 2004 to 0.9 in 2030. 
11. Long-term care 
insurance 
Assumption 10 ii) is also applied to long-term care insurance. 
  31Table 6: Decomposition of net revenue and net primary expenditure growth by level of government 
level in Germany in the period 2007 – 2030 
 
  social sec.  federal gov.  state gov.  local gov. 
net revenue growth 
total 8.0%  -3.0%  0.0%  -2.3% 
- induced by demographics  -10.0%  -6.0%  -4.3%  -5.4% 
- policy induced  13.8%  3.0%  4.2%  3.1% 
- adjustment to achieve sustainability  4.3%  - 
1 - 
1  - 
1 
net primary expenditure growth 
Total 8.0%  -10.3%  -4.1%  4.1% 
- induced by demographics  16.2%  5.6%  -6.9%  -9.1% 
- policy induced  -8.2%  -14.6%  2.6%  -3.1% 
- residual expenditure growth  - 
1  -1.3% 0.2%  16.3% 
1 Zero by assumption. 
Source: Calculations by the authors. 
 
 
Table 7 Distribution of sustainable net primary expenditures across levels of government in Germany
1 
 
  federal government  state government  local government 
2007 46.0%  36.3%  17.7% 
2010 44.3%  36.2%  19.5% 
2020 43.7%  36.5%  19.7% 
2030 43.4%  36.9%  19.7% 
1 Without taking into account the social security system. 























1 Only primary expenditures are taken into account. Source: Calculations based upon data provided by the 

























Source: Calculations based upon data provided by the Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, Germany. 
 
 


















1 Since only primary expenditures are taken into account. net burden has to be interpreted as the per capita 




Figure 4 Fiscal deficit and surplus induced by pure demographic change by level of government in % 

















Source: Calculations by the authors. 
  33Figure 5 Expenditure and revenue growth as well as primary balance of the social security system in 
Germany 
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Source: Calculations by the authors. 
 
 
Figure 6 Net primary expenditures and net revenues as well as primary balance in % of total net 
primary expenditures at the federal government level  
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Source: Calculations by the authors. 
 
  34Figure 7 Net primary expenditures and net revenues as well as primary balance at the state 
government level 







2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030
Model II: net primary expenditures
Model II: net revenues
Model I: net primary expenditures
Mdl I t
 











Source: Calculations by the authors. 
 
 
Figure 8 Net primary expenditures and net revenues as well as primary balance at the local 
government level 
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  35Figure 9 Primary balance of the federal government and subnational government sector in Germany in 
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Source: Calculations by the authors. 
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